Wednesday, March 31, 2010

WHAT THE NOMINAL DOW TELLS US

WHAT THE NOMINAL DOW TELLS US: "

By Elliott Wave International:


You don’t have to tell Bob Prechter this: He knows. A simple price chart of the Dow is, well, a bit too simple. First Bob explains that pricing via fiat currency is not the same as pricing the Dow in terms of real money (namely gold). Then he shows the difference.



For six long years, we’ve had declining real values in stocks. Since the 2002 bottom, we’ve had rising values in nominal terms. This is the same set-up that we saw in the early ’70s except for one thing: it’s bigger. . .Ultimately, real prices are leading dollar prices, and we’re going to see a tremendous drop in the dollar price of the Dow as well, because I’m making a case that this is a much bigger top.

Elliott Wave Theorist, December 2006


nominal dow follows the lead of real dow



If gold were our money, the major stock market indexes would have declined relentlessly from 2000 to the present, with a muted bounce in 2003. There would be no arguing the point of whether a bull or bear market was in force.

Elliott Wave Theorist, March 2006


This “oh-so-true” chart of the DJIA priced in gold showed the path that the “cheatin’” nominal Dow would eventually follow. Our forecast was that it’s just a matter of time. This analysis has played out as expected several times since the 1999 high in the Dow Jones Industrials.

"

When Risk-Return Makes No Sense: How To Deal With An Overvalued Market

When Risk-Return Makes No Sense: How To Deal With An Overvalued Market: "

As SocGen's Dylan Grice points out, we have gotten to the point where the Shiller PE demonstrates S&P valuations are now back in the highest valuation quintile: in other words the market is now more expensive than during 80% of the time. The risk-return at this point makes little sense, because as Grice points out the 10 year return using this quintile as an entry point is just 1.7%, compared to 11% for the lowest quintile. So what should one do: "Go take a holiday if you can. Avoid the ?boredom trades?." If those two are not an option, Dylan provides some trade ideas.

But before we get into it, some amusing observations by Dylan on the Fed's track record of fixing the economy:

It seems central banks botch exit strategies more often than not. In 1994 Greenspan?'s cack-handed removal of the emergency stimulus implemented during the S&L crisis triggered a bond market collapse which severely dented that year?'s equity returns. In 1998, the tardy withdrawal of the emergency stimulus implemented during the Asian crisis created the tech bubble. And in 2004, a similarly delayed withdrawal of the emergency stimulus implemented to combat the tech bust spawned the housing/credit bubble.

Dylan is confident, as are we, that the QE end in less than 24 hour is just a temporary blip in an otherwise determined push to kill the US middle class and especially the savers among it.

Will the botched exit from this emergency stimulus resemble that of the 1994 vintage (bearish for risk) or those of 1998/2004 (bullish)? I suppose central banks might get lucky and smoothly engineer a ?normalisation? without any painful withdrawal symptoms ? but in the real world credit growth remains subdued, as it did in Japan. If the economy doubledips -? and Albert makes a convincing case it will - and fading stimulus leaves the economy in default-deleveraging mode, there won?t be any exit strategy. There will be more QE...

And here we get to the meat of the matter: the market is now way overbought.

If only my crystal ball was clearer ... fortunately though, no crystal ball is needed to see that equity markets are expensive. According to Robert Shiller?s latest data, the S&P500 is back in its highest valuation quintile. The risk is there - as it always is - but the returns aren?t. So what do you do? Go take a holiday if you can. Avoid the ?boredom trades?. But if you have to do something ? some cheap stocks and sectors to think about are given inside.

A way to visualize the expected returns from a trade inception point in any given quintile:


The chart above shows the 10y real returns which have accrued to investors using each valuation quintile as an entry point. If history is any guide, those investing today can expect a whopping 1.7% annualised return over the next ten years.


The bottom-up picture tells the same story. Regular readers know that I use a residual income model to estimate the intrinsic value of each stock in our universe (developed market, large and medium cap non-financials in the FTSE World Index). I aggregate those into an intrinsic value for the market. A more detailed discussion of the calculation is given here, but all I really do is assume that a company which earns only its required return is worth no more than its book value. By capitalising expected excess returns (defined as RoE less required return) onto book value I arrive at an intrinsic value which I can compare to the market price. This gives me an intrinsic value to price (IVP) ratio, the market aggregate for which is given below. When the IVP ratio is 1.0, estimated intrinsic value equals market price. The market is ?fair value? which means it can be expected to deliver the required return (which I set at 10%). This was where we were a year ago. Today, the market is roughly as expensive as it?s recently been.


With Ben Graham investment principles now completely useless courtesy of momentum chasing algos, could the IVP be the next most useful way to shotgun investing?

The IVP ratio isn?t the perfect model by any means and there are a few things about it which make me uncomfortable (e.g. using forecasts to calculate future excess returns). But on balance I think it ticks more boxes than it misses. For one, I like the absolute (as opposed to relative) nature of valuations thrown out. For another, it seems to work. The following left chart shows the performance of stocks over time when sorted into deciles according to their IVP ratios: the higher the IVP ratio, the higher the returns. The right chart shows cumulative returns since 1986 of a hypothetical long-short strategy in which we buy the highest IVP decile stocks and sell the lowest. Both show that there is some sort of ?edge? to be had in purchasing stocks with higher IVP ratios.

Where should investors focus for potential cheap IVP values:

The next chart shows where the geographical value is. The UK has an aggregate intrinsic value above its market capitalization, while the Eurozone looks less egregiously expensive than the rest. I also find it interesting that Japan looks so expensive using an IVP framework. Funnily enough, I think there may be good speculative reasons for owning Japan (which I?ll try to write up shortly) but the investment case is weak. Even though PB and PE ratios are historically low, the earnings power of Japanese assets is even lower and by anchoring valuation on the earnings power of assets the IVP framework picks this up.

And if investing in 'cheap' Chinese stocks is not the most appealing options, here are the sectors which make the most compelling investment proposition.

The following chart shows the sectors trading below intrinsic value. Although a cursory look reveals a heavy resource bias, some interesting sub-sectors emerge. For example, integrated oils are cheap. True, they always seem to be. They?re ?too big? and have gone ?ex-growth.? But the long-term growth numbers I'?ve used for them (e.g. Royal Dutch Shell) are actually negative so they allow for this. And if we overpay for strong growth, mightn'?t we underpay for weak growth? According to Factset, Integrated Oils have been one of the best-performing sectors over the last 15 years returning 12.3% annualized, against 8.5% for the World.


Refiners and construction materials are interesting too, with names like Valero and Lafarge operating in depressed sectors in sluggish developed markets. Surely these are interesting places to look? Among the drillers, Transocean ? the market leading deep-sea driller in an oil market increasingly reliant on deep-sea fields for future growth ? is trading below estimated intrinsic value on our IVP analysis and as such, statistically, it has a higher ?expected return? than other stocks in the market.



Although I exclude financials from my screen (as I?m not sure screening is the right way to look at financial stocks) it?s an interesting sector so I'?ve run the numbers. ?Diversified Financials? includes guys like ING, JP Morgan and BoA, the rest are self explanatory ? the results suggest potentially lucrative pickings here if you can get comfortable with the balance sheets. A big if, I know, but I guess fortune favours those who do their homework.

And finally, here are the names of the individual companies thrown up as having estimated intrinsic values higher than their market values. The names help show who?s driving the sector numbers above, but some notable names from sectors which don’t stand out as cheap include Kingfisher, Finmeccanica, AstraZeneca and Western Digital.


Our caveat: any valuation metric is ultimately merely an affirmative bias for an investor to proceed with putting down capital after already having decided to do so. Our contention, as has been for the past 12 months, is that the only real metrics investors should keep an eye out on are the Fed's H.4.1 and H.3 statements. Everything else is a first through 100th derivative of the greatest excess liquidity flood in the history of the world. When that dries out, babies and bathwaters will get the same March 2009 treatment as they always do when the market realizes the utopia of Dow 36,000 will not occur absent hyperinflation.

"

Friday, March 26, 2010

Kahnemann And Taleb On Biases, The Illusion Of Patterns And The Perception Of Risk And Denial

Kahnemann And Taleb On Biases, The Illusion Of Patterns And The Perception Of Risk And Denial: "

Must watch roundtable with two of the most prominent thinkers of our generation, Daniel Kahnemann and Nassim Taleb. Topics discusses include the GSEs, which according to Taleb 'is sitting on a barrel of dynamite' (and everyone agrees), cognitive biases, patterns (and their lack), and risk and denial perceptions. Via DLDConference.



h/t Nihilarian

"

From A Greek Debt Crisis To A Eurozone Structural One?

From A Greek Debt Crisis To A Eurozone Structural One?: "


When we look back five years from now, will we see this week as marking a turning point in the short, but far from uneventful, ten year history of Europe’s common currency? Certainly recent comments by the deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China have made evident what was already implicit: the dependence of EU sovereign debt on sentiment in global markets, especially in Asia and the Americas. Simon Derrick, chief currency strategist at Bank of New York Mellon even went so far as to say the trauma of recent days might well signal the point that we stop talking about a “Greek debt crisis” and start talking about a “Eurozone structural crisis” . And while Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, was telling us on the one hand that the eurozone will never let Greece fail, Jane Foley, research director at Forex.com busied herself explaining, on the other, that any involvement of the International Monetary Fund in helping Greece to stabilise its fiscal position only heightens the risk that the country might one day end up leaving the eurozone. So just where are we at this point?

Basically it is important to recognise that the current crisis has placed the spotlight on the severe institutional weaknesses which underpin the common currency, and it is just these weaknesses which are leading so many commentators to now ask themselves whether it might not have been easier to implement political union in Europe before embarking on such an ambitious monetary experiment.

These weaknesses became even more clear on Thursday when Jean Claude Trichet went very public in making clear that he personally is totally opposed to IMF participation in any Greece "rescue". “If the IMF or any other authority exercises any responsibility instead of the eurogroup, instead of the governments, this would clearly be very, very bad,” he said on France’s Public Senat television. And this on the same day as Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy were publicly celebrating the triumph of the "Franco-German" entente. Clearly there are still many rivers left to cross before we can say we have reached the other side in this particular structural crisis.

Basically the issues facing Greece are now not primarily fiscal ones. The issue is how to get growth back into the economy fast enough to stop deflation and the economic contraction taking away all the good work achieved through fiscal cutbacks, and how to finance Greek borrowing at a rate of interest which stops the level of indebtedness spiralling upwards out of control.

The Economist magazine have done their own calculation on this, and they estimate that a loan of €75 billion rather than the currently rumoured €25 billion will be needed and that the country is likely to need five years (rather than three) to get its deficit down below 3% of GDP. They also assume that Greek GDP will be 5% below its current level by 2014. Obviously the output you get in these sort of calculations rather depend on the expectations you put in, but these are not unrealistic expectations.

As I explain in this post on the debt snowball problem, only two things really matter at this stage, the rate of change in nominal Greek GDP (that is non price adjusted) and the rate of interest charged on the sovereign debt. As regards nominal GDP, the Economist assume a 5% contraction in 2010. This may seem rather steep, but it does include an anticipated fall in prices as well as a drop in GDP. My own calculations suggest a drop in real GDP of about two percent, rather than the somewhat higher numbers others are talking about. I suggest this number is more realistic given the degree to which the trade deficit is likely to correct, and the net trade impact on headline GDP numbers.

As far as prices goes, I think a one percent fall in the CPI is a reasonable guess at this stage. If you look at the chart below you will see that interannual Greek inflation is still well above the EU 16 average, but prices have now been falling since November, and even though we shouldn’t neglect the impact of tax and public sector tariff increases, prices will almost certainly be down in December 2010 over January. The big difficulty is estimating by how much.

One of the key issues facing Greece at the moment, with large parts of its outstanding debt needing to be refinanced, is just what rate of interest (or extra spread) will have to be paid on any loan (I deal with this question in this post). This is almost a key question, since it can become a "life or death" issue in determining whether or not the country will be forced into default. But here both the EU and the IMF have a problem, since if the Euro Group countries make a loan at a level near to the the current price charged for German debt (which is what should happen if we argue Greek debt carries no additional risk since we are all guaranteeing it), then other countries who are currently paying more (Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Austria etc) may ask why they also could not have such favourable treatment. On the other hand, asking the IMF to make a cheaper loan causes problems, since it could be seen as subsidising Europe in sorting out its problems, and this might not be easily understood in Emerging Economies where there are evidently many more needy cases than Greece’s to think about.

The bottom line is that there is no easy answer here, and Europe is struggling to convince the rest of the world that it has both the will and the instruments to effectively tackle the problem of maintaining a single currency in a diverse group of countries. Herman Van Rompuy said on Friday there was no danger of Portugal being sucked into the same sort of debt whirlpool as Greece, and that Portugal would not be the next country to be sent over to Washington in search of a helping technical hand from the IMF. Which raises the question: if it won’t be Portugal, who will it be?

————–

Edward Hugh also blogs at Global Economy Matters.


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Wednesday, March 24, 2010

Ten ways to spot a bubble in China

Ten ways to spot a bubble in China: "


Edward Chancellor, author of the seminal book on financial speculation and manias “Devil Take The Hindmost,” is now turning his eyes to China. He sees a number of red flags which point to excess in China.

Chancellor writes:

In the aftermath of the credit crunch, the outlook for most developed economies appears pretty bleak. Households need to deleverage. Western governments will have to tighten their purse strings. Faced with such grim prospects at home, many investors are turning their attention toward China. It’s easy to see why they are excited. China combines size – 1.3 billion inhabitants – with tremendous growth prospects. Current income per capita is roughly one-tenth of U.S. levels. The People’s Republic also has a great track record. Over the past thirty years, China’s Gross Domestic Product has increased sixteen-fold.

So what’s the catch? The trouble is that China today exhibits many of the characteristics of great speculative manias. The aim of this paper is to describe the common features of some of the great historical bubbles and outline China’s current vulnerability.

Everyone knows there is extreme levels of excess. The latest report from Andy Xie on local governments shows that governments are now depending on asset prices for revenue, much as they did in places like California during America’s housing bubble.

How can we identify a speculative mania? Chancellor says:

bubbles can be identified ex ante, as the economists like to say. There also exists an interesting, if rather neglected, body of research on leading indicators of financial distress. A few years ago, many of these indicators were pointing to rising economic vulnerability in the United States and other parts of the globe. Today, those red flags are flying around Wall Street’s current darling, The People’s Republic of China.

James Rickards thinks this is the greatest bubble in history. Even Sino-enthusiast Stephen Roach is pointing to a bubble in China. He just thinks the government will be able to prevent its dragging down the real economy.

That’s because Beijing was vigilant in preventing asset and credit bubbles from spilling over into the real side of the Chinese economy. This was very different from the Japan endgame of the late 1980s, where the confluence of equity and property bubbles led to a massive overhang of excess capacity.

Roach’s confidence sounds an awful lot like blind faith in the Chinese authorities to me – exactly the opposite of what Roach’s former colleague Andy Xie is saying.

Chancellor includes this blind faith in the 10 signposts of manias and financial crises (very reminiscent of Kindelberger, by the way).

  1. "Great investment debacles generally start out with a compelling growth story." 100% yes. Check.
  2. "Blind faith in the competence of the authorities." See Roach’s comments above or read Goldilocks is not sleeping in America anymore; she’s now in China. Check.
  3. "A general increase in investment is another leading indicator of financial distress. Capital is generally misspent during periods of euphoria. Only during the bust does the extent of the misallocation become clear." See my posts China’s present growth story is built on malinvestment and Jim Chanos still bearish on China, talks malinvestment for evidence that China is misallocating resources. Check.
  4. "Great booms are invariably accompanied by a surge in corruption. Remember this post." “I want to be a corrupt official when I grow up”? That’s exactly what Chancellor is talking about. Check.
  5. "Strong growth in the money supply is another robust leading indicator of financial fragility. Easy money lies behind all great episodes of speculation from the Tulip Mania of the 1630s – which was funded with IOUs – onward." Andy Xie: Chinese monetary policy has to be tightened Check.
  6. "Fixed currency regimes often produce inappropriately low interest rates, which are liable to feed booms and end in busts." Think Latvia or Argentina. Are the Baltics the new Argentina? And we know China’s peg is creating problems because that’s a bone of contention right now. Check.
  7. "Crises generally follow a period of rampant credit growth." "Enron-Esque Characteristics" Hiding An Even More Explosive Credit Growth In China. Check.
  8. "Moral hazard is another common feature of great speculative manias. Credit booms are often taken to extremes due to a prevailing belief that the authorities won’t let bad things happen to the financial system. Irresponsibility is condoned." See Stephen Roach’s comments again. Check.
  9. "A rising stock of debt is not the only cause for concern. The economist Hyman Minsky observed that during periods of prosperity, financial structures become precarious." See #7 again. Check.
  10. "Dodgy loans are generally secured against collateral, most commonly real estate." The Andy Xie story shows you this. Check.

It looks like China is ten for ten. Is China in a bubble blow-off top like Japan post-Plaza accord? I say yes. Anyone who thinks this will not end badly is in for a rude awakening.

Much more below. Do read the full report. It is a lovely piece of research.

Source

China’s Red Flags (free subscription required) – Edward Chancellor, GMO


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